The Constitutional Court found No 2 / 2000 Coll.
The Constitutional Court found of 23 November 1999 on the application for annulment of part of the provision of Section 248 (2) (e) of the Civil Code
Valid
2
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Czech Republic
On 23 November 1999, the Constitutional Court decided, in plenary, on a proposal by Ing. P. N. to abolish part of the provision of § 248 (2) (e) of the Civil Code in the words "including the order of order"
as follows:
Paragraph 248 (2) (e) of the Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., Civil Code, as amended by Act No. 519 / 1991 Coll., in the words "including the order fines decision ', shall be deleted from the date of the publication of this finding in the Collection of Laws.
Reasons
The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the order of the Municipal Court in Prague of 31 March 1998, sp. zn. 28 Ca 317 / 97, terminating the proceedings in respect of his action against the decision of the President of the Supreme Audit Office (SAO) of 20 May 1997, No 1199 / 95-140 / 3-RK. This decision rejected the appellant's decomposition against the SAO's decision of 12 December 1995 No 95 / 22- SK / 46 and confirmed the imposition of a fine of CZK 50 000 pursuant to § 28 (1) of Act No. 166 / 1993 Coll., on the Supreme Audit Office. This provision provides:
"(1) The Office may impose a fine of up to CZK 50,000 on a natural person who is guilty of failing to fulfil an obligation under Section 24 of this Act.
(2) The fine may also be imposed repeatedly, provided that the obligation has not been fulfilled even within the time limit laid down by the controllers.
(3) The fine may be imposed within one month of the date of non-compliance.
(4) The fines are the income of the state budget of the Czech Republic.
(5) The fines are enforced by the Office. '
The appellant contends that the resolution of the Municipal Court in Prague infringed its rights of judicial protection, including the review of the legality of decisions of a public authority, as it is constitutionally guaranteed by Article 36 (1) and (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights ("the Charter ') and Article 6 (1) of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (" the Convention'). In his view, this infringement took place in the context of the application of Paragraph 248 (2) (e) of the Civil Code (hereinafter referred to as "o.s. '). Paragraph 248 (2) (e), as amended by Act No. 519 / 1991 Coll., provides that the courts also do not examine the following in the administrative justice system:
"a decision of a preliminary, procedural or order nature by the administrative authorities, including a decision on fine-tuning '.
This provision is, according to its claim, in the words "including the decision on fine-tuning 'contrary to Article 36 (1) and (2) of the Charter and Article 6 (1) of the Convention.
The appellant took advantage of the possibility given to him by § 64 (1) (d) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, and, together with a constitutional complaint, filed a motion to abolish part of the provision of § 248 (2) (e) o.s. in the words "including the decision on order fines'. In view of this, the Second Chamber of the Constitutional Court assessed compliance with the conditions laid down in Section 74 of the Constitutional Court Act. A constitutional complaint has been lodged in due time by a legitimate appellant who has been duly represented, the application is not inadmissible and the Constitutional Court is competent to discuss it. Nor was the proposal found to be manifestly unfounded.
Since the alleged interference with the fundamental law took place under the direct application of the provision which is the subject of the application, the Second Chamber of the Constitutional Court concluded that the conditions of Paragraph 78 (1) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll. Therefore, by its resolution of 21 October 1998 No II of the ÚS 254 / 98-24, the Constitutional complaint procedure was suspended and the application for annulment of part of the provision in question was referred to the plenary of the Constitutional Court for a decision pursuant to Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution).
The appellant states that in the proceedings before the Municipal Court in Prague he sought the annulment of the SAO's decision, which imposed an order fine of CZK 50,000 when, in his opinion, the SAO required him to fulfil an obligation which was not imposed by law. The SAO procedure was also formally not flawless. However, the Municipal Court in Prague decided to suspend the proceedings in the present case, justifying its decision by reference to § 248 (2) (e) o.s., according to which courts in administrative justice do not examine decisions of a preliminary, procedural or order nature, including decisions on order fines.
In the appellant's view, the provision in question in the words "including the order of order ', contrary to constitutional rules, excludes a number of decisions of a different nature from judicial review. This may be an order fine of CZK 200 according to the administrative order, but also a fine of CZK 200 according to § 71 paragraph 2 of Act No. 455 / 1991 Coll., on business business (Trade Act), in the amount of CZK 10 000, a similar fine according to § 62 paragraph 2 of Act No. 199 / 1994 Coll., on public procurement or even a fine up to CZK 500 000 pursuant to § 11 of the Act No. 136 / 1994 Coll., on the dyeing and marking of certain hydrocarbon fuels and lubricants and on measures relating thereto. All fines shall be imposed by the administrative authority, may be imposed repeatedly and shall be expressly marked as order fines. This is an extremely serious intervention in the sphere of individual rights, which can also cause economic liquidation of the affected entity. Therefore, in the light of Article 36 (1) and (2) of the Charter and Article 6 (1) of the Convention, the right of the legislator to exclude the possibility of reviewing decisions of a public authority in a very restrictive manner. This follows from Article 4 (4) of the Charter, according to which their substance and meaning must be investigated when applying the provisions on the limits of fundamental rights and freedoms.
According to the appellant's legal opinion, therefore, the non-constitutional flat-rate suspension of judicial review of all so-called order fines is without distinction. On the one hand, he understands the legislature's desire to avoid a disproportionately high idea for the courts in these matters, but on the other hand, many such fines may be very difficult for a delinquent. It is sufficient to abolish the words "including the order-order decision ', since the court itself will be able to assess whether a particular fine is of a purely order nature (such as administrative fines) or whether, in view of circumstances, intensity, the amount of the penalty also affects the rights of a substantive nature. Now the court does not have that discretion and the proceedings must be terminated without examining the substance.
In this context, he also referred to Law No 36 / 1876 of the Czech Republic, which contained, in its Section 3, significantly narrower exclusions from the administrative review, so that the legislation provided citizens with a significantly higher standard of legal protection than it does today by 1952.
At the request of the Judge-Rapporteur, the parties to the application made their views known. On behalf of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, his President Libuše Benešová, who stated that Act No. 519 / 1991 Coll., which introduced the provision in question into the o.s., was adopted at the 18th meeting of the Federal Assembly on 5 November 1991, when 87 out of 92 Members present and in the House of Nations voted for him in the Czech part of 55 Members and 52 Members from 107 in the Slovak part. The Senate has not dealt with the amendment in this section. It is for the Constitutional Court to assess the constitutionality of the proposal for the contested provision
On behalf of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, its President Prof. Ing. Václav Klaus, CSc., who stated that Law No. 519 / 1991 Coll. was adopted by the necessary majority of Members and was duly declared. From a factual point of view, he recalled the content of the explanatory memorandum to that law, which shows that the jurisdiction of the courts in the administrative justice system is laid down by a so-called general clause. The scope of the cases which should be excluded from the review is defined in § 248 o.s., the individual exceptions being formulated in general and therefore apply to all decisions regardless of the legislation on which they are based. Their interpretation should be restrictive as they are exceptions to the general clause. The order fined decision is an institution designed to provide, for example, an effective tool for the supervisory authority to fulfil the obligations directly assigned to it by law and by the Constitution. There is no way that a decision on an order fine will interfere with constitutional rights and freedoms. However, this is not the subject of a complaint as the complainant challenges the unconstitutional nature of the exclusion of the review of such a decision by a court, not the unconstitutional nature of the order of order itself. The President of the Chamber of Deputies does not share this view.
The Constitutional Court first proceeded to assess the formal requirements of the application. The application was submitted by a legitimate complainant under the conditions set out in § 74 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll. The conditions of admissibility laid down in Paragraph 66 (1) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll. were also fulfilled in the present case. The proposal was found admissible and the Constitutional Court was able to proceed further under the guidelines of § 68 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll.
As regards the constitutionality of § 248 (2) (e) o.s.z. in the words "including the order of order ', the Constitutional Court concluded that this provision is not in accordance with Article 36 (1) and (2) of the Charter, Article 6 (1) of the Convention and Article 14 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (" the Pact') in conjunction with Article 1 of the Charter and Articles 1 and 4 of the Constitution.
In the present case, the Constitutional Court carries out an abstract check of constitutionality, regardless of the fact that the impetus for its implementation was a constitutional complaint. If the proposal has complied with the requirements of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., it must be treated in the same way as the proposals of other authorised applicants pursuant to § 64 (1) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll. It is therefore not an assessment of the fine in a particular case by the appellant (§ 28 (1) of Act No 166 / 1993 Coll.), but rather an assessment of the concept of "order fine 'used in general in § 248 (2) (e) o.s. in its entirety, i.e. also where the" order' penalty is not specifically mentioned, but if the fine is "order '. Although the appellant argues that this term" order' applies all the provisions mentioned by it, it is precisely in the case of Article 28 (1) of Law No 166 / 1993 Coll. which does not correspond to the facts. The case was examined by the Constitutional Court as follows.
This term is used by a number of civil, criminal and administrative procedural law laws and by legislation governing the status and competence of control and inspection authorities. These decisions are designed as civil procedural, criminal, procedural or administrative penalties, i.e. measures to help ensure the smooth conduct of a particular procedure and the synergies of its participants in the event that they would not be willing to participate in the proceedings in the manner provided for by the law (to appear, to produce the required documents, to issue matters relevant to the proceedings, etc.), or otherwise to make it difficult or even obstruct. It is therefore possible to store them again and again until the appropriate procedure is ensured (not the principle, not bis in idem).
The sanctions imposed by the administrative authorities as a measure were originally more designed as an indication of the obligation to respect the rules laid down and did not reach a degree of repression or prevention in the sense of criminal and administrative criminal offences. As an example, Paragraph 45 (1) of the Administrative Regulation, according to which those who make the procedure difficult, in particular by failing to appear at the administrative authority's request for no serious reason, cancels the order of order despite a prior warning, unjustifiably refusing to give evidence, to produce a document or to carry out an examination, the administrative authority may impose an order of order up to CZK 200; in the case of soldiers in active duty and members of the Public Armed Corps, surrender the case to be dealt with in accordance with disciplinary provisions. In recent years, however, there has been a tendency to increase the amounts imposed in the form of "order fines."
It is similar in nature to the administrative fines in control and inspection activities. Here, too, it is their job to ensure the proper conduct of the control action, which would, as a rule, be impracticable without the cooperation of the controlled ones. In addition, there are some particularities related to the nature of the control activity itself compared to procedural measures. As regards the audit activities of SAO inspectors, they are entitled to:
(a) enter the premises, facilities and operations, land and other premises of the checked persons in so far as they relate to the subject matter of the inspection;
(b) require controlled persons to submit, within the time limits set, original documents and other documents, records of data on storage media of computer devices, their extracts and source codes of programmes, samples of products or other goods;
(c) familiarisation with classified information if it proves to be a certificate for the relevant classification level of such information, issued under a special law;
(d) to require the persons checked to provide true and complete, oral and written information on the facts and the relevant facts;
(e) to provide documents in justified cases; their receipt must be confirmed in writing to the person checked and a copy of the documents taken over must be kept to him;
(f) require checked persons to submit a written report within the time limit set on the correction of the deficiencies detected;
(g) to use telecommunications equipment of persons checked in cases where their use is necessary to ensure control.
According to Article 24 (1) of Act No. 166 / 1993 Coll., controlled persons are obliged to provide synergies corresponding to the above-mentioned powers of the controlling (§ 21 of Act No. 166 / 1993 Coll.). Natural persons are not obliged under § 21 (d) of Act No. 166 / 1993 Coll., if they would cause the risk of criminal prosecution to themselves or to persons close to them. If they do not provide such cooperation, the SAO may impose a fine on them within one month of the date of failure to fulfil the obligation of up to CZK 50 000, even repeatedly if the obligation was not fulfilled even within the time limit set by the inspectors. Similar rules are laid down in the Rules of Control under Act No. 552 / 1991 Coll., on State Control, as amended. However, the cumulative amount of the measure, which is expressly referred to here as the "order" fine, cannot exceed CZK 200,000.
In the present case, the Constitutional Court concluded that, even if the fine is not expressly designated as an order, it fulfils the features of the order of order in the sense of the administrative measure. It comes from her nature, purpose and purpose. The SAO in the exercise of its control activities is equipped with the upper-class authority to the audited entities (cf. Section 21 of Act No. 166 / 1993 Coll.). The control shall be carried out in a legally regulated manner in which it is entitled to require the performance of statutory obligations on the part of the controlled entities. If a controlled entity which has such an obligation fails to comply with that obligation and makes it difficult or obstructs the control action, its compliance may be enforced by order measures in various forms, including fines. The fine provided for in Article 28 (1) of Law No 166 / 1993 Coll. undoubtedly has the character of a measure which is referred to as an order fine in Article 19 of Law No 552 / 1991 Coll..
However, the Constitutional Court points out that it did not assess in the present case whether the SAO could exercise control in the case it initiated the proceedings and whether, therefore, such an obligation on the part of the responsible body was justified. The initiative was merely a question of the constitutionality of the refusal of justice (denegatio iustitiae) in the form of the termination of proceedings before the Municipal Court in Prague due to the exclusion of the review of administrative measures, including decisions on fines. It will be up to the General Court to examine this particular problem. The Constitutional Court did not consider it necessary to enter into this matter in order to minimise interference in the competence of the general courts (here the administrative judiciary). Similarly, the Constitutional Court generally did not assess the extent to which such measures are in fact "ordered fines' in individual legislation and to what extent indirectly penalties for infringement of substantive law, as this was not also the subject of proceedings.
It can therefore be concluded that the fine provided for in Article 28 (1) of Law No 166 / 1993 Coll. is comparable to other fines which are explicitly referred to as "order-order 'and are therefore affected by the exclusion provided for in Article 248 (2) (e) o.s.cz. In such a case, their exclusion from judicial review would be contrary to Article 36 (2) of the Charter, which provides that decisions concerning fundamental rights and freedoms under the Charter may not be excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts. For the same reason, § 248 (2) (e) o.s.cz would also be contrary to Article 4 of the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court concluded that the order fines imposed in administrative proceedings and in control activities are generally capable of intervening in the fundamental rights and freedoms of the legal entity with regard to their size and the possibility of re-imposing them. They can be issued on a discretionary basis, so that the discriminatory effect of imposing them on different entities is not excluded. If our legal system provides for the possibility of repeatedly imposing an order fine of up to CZK 500,000 (§ 11 of Act No. 136 / 1994 Coll.), this is a significant interference with the status of legal entity.
The question which specific constitutional fundamental rights are infringed by the contested provision has come to the conclusion of the Constitutional Court, without having considered it necessary to examine all constitutional aspects of the problem, that it is, in particular, a breach of equality in public law under Article 1 of the Charter in conjunction with a violation of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 (1) of the Convention.
Article 1 of the Charter guarantees equality in rights to public authority. In the case of civil-law measures (Sections 53 and 54 o.s.) and criminal proceedings (Sections 66 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), judicial review of such measures is guaranteed by a higher judicial instance. In the context of administrative decisions, the person concerned does not have this option. This alone would result in the inconstitutionality of such an arrangement if there were no serious grounds for a judicial lockout. In the present case, the Constitutional Court did not find such serious reasons. On the contrary, by comparing the extent of possible intervention by the so-called "order measure ', it concluded that the administrative penalties are of a much more serious nature in a number of cases than in the case of civil or criminal proceedings, given the possible level of those measures. The reason for the exceptional inequality in the rights of the participants in the administrative (and control process) and the participants in the trial was therefore not found in this area.
The Constitutional Court also assessed whether there is at least one particular constitutional right which is infringed by the contested regulation. Without seeking all possible infringements, he has found an infringement of the constitutionally guaranteed right of judicial protection under Article 6 (1) of the Convention, which ensures to everyone: "the right to have his case dealt with fairly, publicly and within a reasonable period of time by an independent and impartial court, established by law, which decides on his civil rights or obligations or on the legality of any criminal charges against him. The judgment must be declared in public, but the press and the public may be excluded either for the entire or part of the process in the interests of morality, public order or national security in a democratic society, or where the interests of minors or the protection of the private life of the participants so require, or, to the extent deemed necessary by the court, if, in the light of special circumstances, the public proceedings could be prejudicial to the interests of justice '.
The appellant did not substantiate its claim in any way, merely stating that all fines are imposed by the administrative authority, may be imposed repeatedly and are all explicitly marked as order fines and are an extremely serious interference in the sphere of individual rights which can also cause economic liquidation of the affected entity. The Constitutional Court could not agree with this appellant's argument, but according to its case law it is bound by the petition and not by its reasoning.
In particular, the Constitutional Court takes the view that Article 6 (1) of the Convention does not affect administrative decisions and administrative decisions as such, but guarantees judicial review of such decisions in the event that they can be placed under the concept of "civil rights or obligations, les droits et obligations de caractère civil ', which are widely understood by the European institutions. However, the imposition of an order fine is a proper procedural penalty, which serves to enforce a procedural obligation and thus an act of a supremacy, even if it is property-based, affects ownership and associated other rights, such as the pursuit of business activities (as the appellant contends), but also all other rights which are somehow linked to the need for ownership of property.
In the present case, however, this is a civil obligation in the sense of civil (understood as public law, in English referred to as "civil '), rather than a civil (civil) obligation to ensure the capacity of state power necessary in the conditions of democratic society. This is not a private relationship within the meaning of Article 6 (1) of the Convention or within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 90 of the Constitution. This is a supreme relationship to ensure that the state and public administration are able to perform their functions at all. In this respect, the Constitutional Court did not recognise the complainant's objections.
The Constitutional Court therefore addressed the second area of application of the fair process requirements set out in Article 6 (1) of the Convention by the concept of "the legitimacy of any criminal charge '.
Order fines in administrative proceedings are penalties for unlawful conduct. As mentioned above, civil rights and obligations do not derive from civil rights and obligations in any way widely understood by civil law. Their mission is to punish those who violate their obligations in public relations. From the point of view of the case-law of the European institutions, in Article 6 (1) of the Convention, the turn of "the legitimacy of any criminal charges' to everything that is marked as criminal charges in national law. In addition, however, this concept was also related to an infringement charge which national law did not consider criminal. In our terms, for example, there could be prison sentences in the military if no reservation was made in this regard when accessing the Convention made to its Articles 5 and 6, a reservation in the sense that these provisions do not prevent the imposition of disciplinary prison sentences under Article 17 of Act No. 76 / 1959 Coll., on certain service conditions of soldiers. In other words, it is a matter of national regulation which it designates as a criminal offence and which will automatically be under Article 6 (1) of the Convention (right to a fair trial). On the contrary, the State cannot arbitrarily identify something as a criminal offence while threatening sanctions more serious than in a comparable area of criminal law.
In the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, "criminal charge" is also more widely understood than mere criminal charges of criminal offences under national criminal rules, such as § 160 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The erroneous translation of the term "offence" in Article 5 (1) (c) of the Convention has finally been brought to the attention of the Constitutional Court (Collection of finds and resolutions of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, p. 1, p. 144). Therefore, it is not only the formal character (measure under criminal law) that can be relied upon, but also the material characteristics of the assessment of whether such measures are merely reparation, compensation (typical of remedies for control and supervision), but of a penalty that acts in a preventive manner (so that the responsible body does not repeat the infringement) and repressive (to be affected by what it has done). The rigour of a penalty, which may not only consist in deprivation, but also in a financial penalty, which is comparable to other sanctions where the right to a fair trial is ensured, is also important.
The Constitutional Court concludes that the order fines in the legal order of the Czech Republic constitute such a penalty for criminal conduct under Article 6 (1) of the Convention. They are laid down by law and intended as preventive and, at the same time, repressive measures by public authorities. Their amount (up to CZK 500,000 repeatedly) should therefore be compared to the nature of the offences, for which a penalty can also be imposed. Such crimes are known by our criminal law to dozens and relate to the issue of the conduct of certain legal processes and controls (such as Sections 124a to 124c, § 125, 129, 145a, 148a, 169b, 171, 175, 176, 255, 257a of the penal law). According to Section 53 of the Criminal Act, the financial penalty lies in the obligation to pay the State between CZK 2,000 and CZK 5 million. The right to a fair trial is guaranteed in their case.
Therefore, if the penalty in the form of a penalty is (often lower than the fine) under Article 6 (1) of the Convention, there is no reasonable reason why this should not be the case in the case of order fines which are often not even required to be guilty (but not in the case of § 28 (1) of Act No 166 / 1993 Coll.). The same applies to offences for which a fine can be imposed as a penalty, which is subject to review by the court under § 83 of the Act of Infringements if it exceeds CZK 2,000. Here, by the way, the Constitutional Court notes that any penalty for an offence is under Article 6 (1) of the Convention (cf. Case of Lauko v Slovakia. European Court of Human Rights 4 / 1998 / 907 / 1119 of 2.9.1998 and Case of Cadubec v Slovakia. European Court of Human Rights 5 / 1998 / 908 / 1120 of 2.9.1998), even if the fine does not reach the above. This is without prejudice to the fact that the offence is not punishable by a custodial sentence and the sentence is not kept in a separate register. Therefore, such a procedure does not fulfil the requirement of the proportionality of the intervention of a public authority as part of the concept of a rule of law under Article 1 of the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court thus concludes that the provisions of § 248 (2) (e) o. s., in the words "including the decision on fines', do not comply with Article 6 (1) of the Convention in conjunction with Articles 1 and 4 of the Constitution, Articles 1, 36 (1) and (2) of the Charter.
The refusal of judicial protection in respect of the review of decisions of public authorities is possible where the law so provides. However, this is not possible in the case of decisions relating to fundamental rights and freedoms under the Charter, the Constitution and the international conventions under Article 10 of the Constitution. Any other procedure is contrary to Article 36 (2) of the Charter and Article 4 of the Constitution. Each natural and legal person has a constitutional right to a fair trial in the Czech Republic under Article 6 (1) of the Convention.
However, in the case of an order order order decision, the law does not guarantee § 248 (2) (e) o. s. This requirement does not guarantee the granting of any other protection in the form of an appeal to a higher administrative instance, in the case at hand, in the form of decomposition to the President of the SAO. However, the President of the SAO does not meet the requirements of Article 36 (1) of the Charter, Article 6 (1) of the Convention and Article 14 (1) of the Pact, even though he is not directly appointed as a government or a higher administrative authority, unlike administrative authorities. It cannot, in particular, comply with the requirement of an impartial body in that it cannot be understood as such by the appellant. Nor does the constitutional definition of the SAO as an independent body (Article 97 of the Constitution) guarantee the fulfilment of Article 81 of the Constitution, Article 36 (1) of the Charter and Article 6 (1) of the Convention, as it relates to the SAO's control activities in relation to executive agencies, not to the imposition of order fines where the SAO does not act as an independent tribunal but as an administrative authority.
At the same time, this procedure does not guarantee equality in the rights of the equally affected entities of the constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms referred to in Article 1 of the Charter. It is also contrary to the principle of proportionality of intervention by a public authority, as follows from Article 1 of the Constitution, which requires public authority in the Czech Republic to act according to the rules of the rule of law. These rules also include the principle of proportionality of intervention, the rule of rational justification of intervention (prohibition of arbitrariness) and the prohibition of excessive use of otherwise rational regulatory instruments. Since this point has already been found to be in breach of constitutional rules for the reasons set out above, the Constitutional Court has no longer dealt with other reasons, as this was not necessary from the point of view of possible future legislation, when the only solution is to abolish this section of Section 248 (2) (e) (c) and to allow judicial control of decisions on fines issued in the field of administrative law and control activities.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Kessler v. r.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found No 2 / 2000 Coll., on the application for annulment of part of the provision § 248 (2) (e) of the Civil Code |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | - |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 07.01.2000 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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